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Abstract 
We report in this note some results on the theoretical likelihood of Condorcet's Other Paradox in three alternative 
elections. This paradox occurs when we have a voting situation such that no Wheighted Scoring Rule (WSR) will 
select the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner as the WSR winner. We conclude from our study that actual observances of 
Condorcet's Other Paradox should be very rare events.
 
Citation: William v. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, (2009) ''A note on Condorcet's other paradox'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 29 no.3 pp. 
2000-2007. 
Submitted: Jun 08 2009.   Published: August 18, 2009. 
 
       1 
1. Introduction  
 
     We consider in this note the problem of a group of n voters having to choose an 
alternative among a set of three alternatives (or candidates) A, B and C. Individual voter 
preferences  on  alternatives  are  supposed  to  be  both  complete  and  transitive  and  are 
expressed as linear preference rankings. Fig. 1.1 shows each of the six possible linear 
preference rankings that each voter might have in a three-alternative election. 
 
      A  A  B  C  B  C 
      B  C  A  A  C  B 
      C  B  C  B  A  A 
      1 n   2 n   3 n   4 n   5 n   6 n  
Fig. 1.1 The six possible linear preference rankings on three candidates 
Here, ni denotes the number of voters that have the associated linear preference ranking, 
with ∑ =
6
1 i i n = n. A voting situation denotes any particular combination of  s n' i  that sum 
to n.  Voting situations just report the  i n values that are associated with each possible 
individual preference ranking for a given election, without specifying the preferences of 
any individual voter. A voter preference profile, or voter profile, gives a complete list 
that shows the specific linear preference order that is held by each individual voter.  A 
voting situation can be obtained from a voter profile simply by determining the number 
of voters within the profile that have each of the possible linear preference rankings.  As 
a result, voters’ preferences are not anonymous in the case of a voter profile, but they are 
in a voting situation. 
     Let AMB denote the event that A defeats B by Pairwise Majority Rule (PMR) when 
only preferences on the pair of candidates A and B are considered in voters’ preference 
rankings.  It  follows  from  the  notation  adopted  in  Fig.  1.1  that  AMB  if 
[ ] 6 5 3 4 2 1 n n n n n n + + > + + . Then, A will be the winner by PMR, or the Pairwise Majority 
Rule Winner (PMRW) when both AMB and AMC. The PMRW is commonly referred to 
as the Condorcet  Winner, since Condorcet (1785) was  a very strong  advocate of the 
argument  that  the  PMRW  should  always  be  selected  as  the  winner  of  an  election. 
Condorcet was also the first to demonstrate that a PMRW does not always exist (it can 
occur that, for instance, AMB, BMC and CMA) and this phenomenon is known as the 
Condorcet’s Paradox. 
     In this note, we are interested in another paradox that was considered by Condorcet 
(1785)  in  his  seminal  work.  This  paradox  is  concerned  with  the  general  notion  of  a 
Weighted Scoring Rule  (WSR).  A WSR gives some number of points to candidates 
according to their relative position within individual voter’s preference rankings.  For 
three-candidate elections, we will assume in the following that a general WSR assigns 1 
point to a candidate for each time it is most preferred in a voter’s preference ranking,  l  
points for each time it is ranked as second most preferred, and 0 point for each least 
preferred ranking.  Three well known WSR’s in voting theory are the Borda Rule (BR) 
which takes  2 / 1 = l , the Plurality Rule (PR) which takes  0 = l and the Negative Plurality 
Rule (NPR) which takes  1 = l .  We suppose  1 0 £ £ l since it would not make sense to 
award more points to the middle ranked candidate in a voter’s preference ranking than to   2 
the most preferred candidate in the ranking, or to award fewer points to the middle ranked 
candidate than to the least preferred candidate. Consequently, the weighted score for each 
alternative is 
      ( ) ( ) 4 3 2 1 , n n n n A Score + + + = l l  
      ( ) ( ) 6 1 5 3 n n n n , B Score + + + = l l  
      ( ) ( ) 5 2 6 4 n n n n , C Score + + + = l l . 
     Condorcet  (1785)  gives  the  example  voting  situation  in  Fig.  1.2  to  show  a 
phenomenon that Fishburn (1974) refers to as Condorcet’s Other Paradox.    
 
    A     A    B    C    B    C 
    B     C    A       A      C    B 
    C     B    C       B    A    A 
            30 1 = n     1 2 = n    29 3 = n   10 4 = n   10 5 = n 1 6 = n . 
Fig. 1.2 A voting situation showing Condorcet’s Other Paradox from Condorcet (1785) 
Condorcet notes that AMB (41-40) and AMC (61-20) in this voting situation, so that 
Candidate A is the PMRW, and then computes ( ) A Score  and  ( ) B Score  for the general WSR 
with weights 1, l  and 0: 
( )
( ) ). 1 30 ( 10 29 ,
) 10 29 ( 1 30 ,
+ + + =






In order for Candidate A to be elected by a WSR, we must have: 
( ) ( ) l l , , B Score A Score >  
l l 31 39 39 31 + > +  
8 8 > l  
. 1 > l  
This contradicts our definition of a WSR, so that no WSR can elect the PMRW in this 
example, which is Condorcet’s Other Paradox.  Fishburn (1974) generalizes this result for 
all  3 ³ m , to show that there is always some voting situation with a PMRW in an m-
candidate election, such that every WSR will have at least  2 - m  candidates with a greater 
score than the PMRW. Such voting situations are obviously problematic and there is a 
resulting interest in determining estimates for the likelihood that they occur. 
In the present paper, which focuses on three-alternative elections, we consider that 
Condorcet’s Other Paradox occurs when we have a voting situation such that no WSR 
with  1 0 £ £ l  will select the PMRW as the WSR winner and our aim is to compute the 
probability of such a phenomenon. Two alternative (and common) probability models 
will be used, both of which being based on a notion of equiprobability. The first one is 
known as the Impartial Culture (IC) condition and assumes that every voter profile is 
equally  likely  to  occur.  The  second  one  is  the  Impartial  Anonymous  Culture  (IAC) 
condition which supposes that every voting situation is equally likely to occur. 
 
 
2. Probability of Condorcet’s Other Paradox 
 
     A  considerable  amount  of  research  effort  has  been  done  to  develop  mathematical 
representations  for  the  probability  that  Condorcet’s  Paradox  will  be  observed  (see   3 
Gehrlein, 2006). By contrast, much less attention has been paid to Condorcet’s Other 
Paradox. There has been however some earlier work done to compute the probability that 
a stronger version of this paradox will be observed under the assumption of Impartial 
Culture (IC) as  ¥ ® n .  To describe this earlier work, let BDA denote the event that 
candidate  B  will  dominate  candidate  A  by  defeating  it  for  every  possible  WSR  with 
1 0 £ £ l .  Similarly, let  { } X BD  denote the event that B dominates each candidate in a set 
X.  A study by Merlin et al (2002) uses geometric techniques to obtain a representation 
that can lead to the conditional probability,  { } ( ) PMRW is A | IC , , C , A B P     ¥ D ,  that candidate B 
will be the overall winner for every WSR with  1 0 £ £ l , given that A is the PMRW as 
¥ ® n  with the assumption of IC.  This situation is obviously more restrictive than our 
definition of Condorcet’s Other Paradox. 
     We start by replicating the basic results from Merlin et al (2002) by using another 
(standard) approach to the problem, based on the Central Limit Theorem, to obtain a 
representation for the probability  { } ( ) IC , , PMRW is A & C , A B P ¥       D  that candidate B dominates 
both A and C when A is the PMRW.  We know from Saari (1992) that, if candidate B is 
the overall winner by both PR and NPR, then B dominates both A and C. Consequently, 
there are six events that must occur simultaneously in a voting situation for having B 
dominating both A and C when A is the PMRW: 
 
      AMC      [ ] 6 5 4 3 2 1 n n n n n n + + > + +     (1) 
      AMB      [ ] 6 5 3 4 2 1 n n n n n n + + > + +     (2) 
      ( ) ( ) 0 0 , A Score , B Score >   [ ] 2 1 5 3 n n n n + > +       (3) 
      ( ) ( ) 0 0 , C Score , B Score >   [ ] 6 4 5 3 n n n n + > +       (4)  
      ( ) ( ) 1 1 , A Score , B Score >   [ ] 4 2 6 5 n n n n + > +       (5) 
      ( ) ( ) 1 1 , C Score , B Score >   [ ] 4 2 3 1 n n n n + > +       (6) 
   
     Discrete variables, 
j
t X  for  6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = t , are defined for the event that each of these six 
restrictions will be observed in a randomly selected linear preference ranking for the  th j  
voter.  Let  i p  denote the probability that a randomly selected voter from the population 
of voters will have the corresponding linear preference ranking (see Fig. 1.1). The six 
discrete variables are defined in terms of the  i p  probabilities for preference rankings in 
the following way: 
 
6 5 4
3 2 1 1
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     Given that IC implies 1 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4 p = 5 p = 6 p =1/6, the correlation matrix that results 







































































1 R  
 
Then  { } ( ) IC PMRW is A C A B P , ,     &   , ¥ D   is  equivalent  to  the  multivariate  normal  positive 
orthant probability ( ) 1
6 R F .  And the symmetry of IC with respect to candidates requires 
that the probability that the same candidate, that is not the PMRW, will dominate the two 
other  candidates,  including  the  PMRW,  is  obtained  as  ( ) 1
6 6 R F .    Merlin  et  al  (2002) 
obtain a very complex representation for this probability and use quadrature to obtain a 
value of .01808.  By using the procedure of Naylor et al (1966) to obtain Monte Carlo 
simulation estimates of  ( ) 1
6 R F , we obtain a similar probability value.  To make this 
probability conditional on the fact that a PMRW exists, we simply make a modification 
and  use  the  relationship  ( ) ( ) IC PPMRW , , 3 / 6
1
6 ¥ F R ,  where  ( ) IC PPMRW , , 3 ¥   denotes  the 
probability that a PMRW exists. As it is well known that  ( ) IC PPMRW , , 3 ¥ =.9123 (see e.g. 
Gehrlein, 2006), we obtain a probability value of .01982. 
     All of this indicates that the probability of observing this phenomenon is quite small.  
This result, however, could be biased on two accounts.  
∙ First, it could be the result of the IC assumption.  The impact of this assumption can be 
tested by doing the same analysis with the assumption of IAC. Under IAC, the desired 
probability can be obtained by dividing the number of voting situations described by Eqs. 
1 to 6 (multiplied by two, to take into account the fact that C can be the overall winner for 
every WSR instead of B) by the number of voting situations such that A is the PMRW. 
An algorithm based on Ehrhart polynomial theory was used to compute these numbers 
with IAC as a function of n, following a procedure developed in Lepelley et al (2008). 
We obtain that, with the assumption of IAC, the probability of having B or C the overall 
winner for every WSR given that A is the PMRW is given as: 
2 2
2 3
) 4 ( ) 2 ( 3240
) 864 468 429 38 )( 12 (
+ +
+ - - -
n n
n n n n n    5 
 for n=24, 48, 72, 96... The resulting conditional probability as  ¥ ® n  is then reduced to 
38/3240= 19/1620 = .01173, so the small increase in voter dependence that is suggested 
by  IAC  (see  e.g.  Berg  and  Lepelley,  1994)  makes  the  already  small  IC  probability 
significantly smaller. 
∙ Second, if Condorcet’s Other Paradox, as we have defined it, is to be perceived as a real 
potential threat to elections, then the restrictions that we have just considered might be 
creating a significant understatement of the paradox. 
 
 
3. A More Relaxed Condition 
 
  The  restrictions  that  are  used  by  Merlin  et  al  (2002)  can  be  relaxed  by  just 
considering the possibility that some other given candidate always dominates the PMRW, 
but where this given candidate does not necessarily dominate the remaining candidate 
that is not the PMRW.  This would be obtained for one particular such occurrence with 
the  probability  ( ) IC PMRW is A A B P , ,     & ¥ D   in  which  candidate  B  dominates  the  PMRW 
candidate  A.      The  representation  for  this  probability  will  follow  directly  from  the 
discussion above, since the conditions that lead to its occurrence in a voting situation 
follow from the restrictions in Eqs. 1 through 6 above, with the conditions of Eqs. 4 and 6 
being  removed.    It  follows  directly  that  we  can  obtain  a  representation  for 
( ) IC , , PMRW is A & A B P ¥     D   as  a  multivariate  normal  positive  orthant  probability, ( ) 2
4 R F  
,with a correlation matrix  2 R  that is obtained from  1 R  by removing the terms that are 
associated with variables 
j X 4  and 









































2 R . 
 
The  form  of  2 R   does  not  lead  to  a  simple  representation  for  ( ) 2
4 R F ,  so  we  use  a 
procedure from Gehrlein (1979) to evaluate it by quadrature, with  ( ) 003234 2
4 . » F R .  It is 
not possible to have a voting situation in which both B and C dominate A when A is the 
PMRW,  since  this  would  require  the  PMRW  to  be  ranked  last  by  BR,  which  is 
impossible.    The  symmetry  of  IC  with  respect  to  candidates  therefore  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  conditional  probability  that  some  given  candidate  dominates  the 
PMRW, given that a PMRW exists is given by  ( ) ( ) IC PPMRW , , 3 / 6
2
4 ¥ F R .  This value is 
given by .02127. 
  The use of this less restrictive condition does not result in a significant increase in 
the conditional probability of observing the outcome that is described by Merlin et al 
(2002).  When the probability of having BDA, given that A is PMRW, is calculated for 
IAC as a function of n, we obtain (using the same approach as above):   6 
2 2
2 3
) 4 ( ) 2 ( 80
) 352 24 17 )( 8 (
+ +
+ + - -
n n
n n n n  
for n=8, 16, 24, 32…  Thus, as  ¥ ® n , the resulting probability is 1/80 = .0125.  Again, 
the  slight  degree  of  dependence  that  is  suggested  by  IAC  significantly  decreases  the 
already small probability that is obtained with the assumption of IC. 
 
 
4. Another Relaxation Condition  
 
  We can obtain a representation for the probability that Condorcet’s Other Paradox 
is observed by considering another relaxation of the conditions that were given by Merlin 
et al (2002).   Suppose that candidate A is the PMRW and that it is not dominated by 
either B or C, but A is still never selected as the WSR for any  1 0 £ £ l .  Such an outcome 
can occur in a voting situation in which 
 
  AMC        [ ] 6 5 4 3 2 1 n n n n n n + + > + +       (7) 
  AMB        [ ] 6 5 3 4 2 1 n n n n n n + + > + +       (8) 
  ( ) ( ) 0 0 , A Score , B Score >     [ ] 2 1 5 3 n n n n + > +         (9) 
  ( ) ( ) 0 0 , C Score , A Score >     [ ] 6 4 2 1 n n n n + > +         (10) 
  ( ) ( ) 1 1 , A Score , C Score >     [ ] 3 1 6 5 n n n n + > +         (11) 
  ( ) ( ) 1 1 , B Score , A Score >     [ ] 6 5 4 2 n n n n + > +         (12) 
  ( ) ( ) * , * , l l A Score C Score >   ( ) ( ) [ ] 4 3 2 1 5 2 6 4 * * n n n n n n n n + + + > + + + l l   (13) 
 
Candidate C does not dominate A because A beats C under PR due to the restriction in 
Eq. 10.  Similarly, candidate B does not dominate A since A beats B under NPR in Eq. 12.  
It follows directly from the linearity of  ( ) l , X Score  as l increases for each { } C , B , A X Î , that 
A must always be beaten by either B or C if it is also true that a value of  * l  exists for 
some  1 0 < < * l   with  ( ) ( ) * , B Score * , C Score l l =   and  in  addition  we  have 
( ) ( ) * , A Score * , C Score l l > . 
  In order to have  ( ) ( ) * , B Score * , C Score l l = , we need  
( ) ( ) 6 1 5 3 5 2 6 4 n n * n n n n * n n + + + = + + + l l , 
so that         
6 1 5 2
6 4 5 3
n n n n




= l . 
  For  ( ) ( ) * , A Score * , C Score l l > , 
( ) ( ) 4 3 2 1 5 2 6 4 n n * n n n n * n n + + + > + + + l l , 
so that 
  ( ) ( ) 4 3
6 1 5 2
6 4 5 3
2 1 5 2
6 1 5 2
6 4 5 3
6 4 n n
n n n n
n n n n
n n n n
n n n n




+ + > +
- - +
- - +
+ + .    (14) 
 
  If we sum Eqs. 9 through 12, and reduce the results, we obtain 
        6 1 5 2 n n n n + > + . 
   7 
So, the result that is given above to require  ( ) ( ) * , A Score * , C Score l l >  in Eq. 14 becomes 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ). n n n n n n n n n n n n
n n n n n n n n n n n n
4 3 6 4 5 3 6 1 5 2 2 1
5 2 6 4 5 3 6 1 5 2 6 4
                + - - + + - - + +
> + - - + + - - + +
 
 
This can be reduced to make the restriction in Eq. (14) equivalent to 












1 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n + + + + + > + + + + + .  (15) 
 
The nonlinear nature of the restriction in Eq. 15 makes it very difficult to obtain an 
estimate of this probability with the assumption of IC.  However, Monte-Carlo simulation 
was used to obtain an estimate of this probability with the assumption of IAC as  ¥ ® n , 
following a procedure developed in Tovey (1997).  The conditional probability that a 
profile exists for which the PMRW is not dominated by either of the other candidate, and 
still  is  never  selected  as  the  winner  for  any  WSR,  given  that  a  PMRW  exists,  is 
approximated as .00017.  This is an extremely small probability.  Adding this to the IAC 
probability from the previous section, we obtain the probability that Condorcet’s Other 
Paradox, as we have defined it, will be observed. The resulting probability for IAC as 
¥ ® n  is only .01267, to indicate that actual observances of Condorcet’s Other Paradox 
should be rare events. If we couple this observation with the knowledge of the fact that 
IC  and  IAC  are  expected  to  give  inflated  estimates  of  the  probability  that  voting 
paradoxes will be observed, it can be concluded that actual observances of Condorcet’s 
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